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OPINION 
_______________ 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
This matter comes before us on a petition for a writ of 
certiorari filed by the United Industrial, Service, 
Transportation, Professional and Government Workers of 
North America Seafarers Union (“Union”) on behalf of 
Ernest Bason, Esq., asking us to review a decision by the 
Virgin Islands Supreme Court.  On December 28, 2012, the 
President signed H.R. 6116, “a bill that would eliminate our 
certiorari jurisdiction over final decisions of the Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court and replace it with direct review by 
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the Supreme Court of the United States.”  Kendall v. Daily 
News Publ’g Co., 716 F.3d 82, 86 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation 
omitted) (“Kendall I”).  We conclude that we retain certiorari 
jurisdiction over proceedings that were filed in the Virgin 
Islands courts before the date of enactment of H.R. 6116.  
Although we thereby still possess certiorari jurisdiction with 
respect to the proceedings filed by the Union and the 
Government of the Virgin Islands in the Virgin Islands 
Superior Court, we nevertheless must dismiss the Union’s 
certiorari petition as moot.  Accordingly, we cannot—and do 
not—reach the question of “whether title 24, section 374(a) of 
the Virgin Islands Code is harmonious with title 3, section 
113(a) of the Virgin Islands Code.” 
 
I. 
 
 Ernest F. Bason, Esq., was employed as an Assistant 
Attorney General with the Virgin Islands Department of 
Justice.  Most Assistant Attorneys General, including Bason, 
were subject to a collective bargaining agreement, and the 
Union served as their exclusive bargaining representative.  In 
a July 1, 2010 letter, the Virgin Islands Attorney General 
informed Bason that he intended to impose a suspension and 
to terminate his employment.  The Union filed a grievance on 
Bason’s behalf challenging this action.  In a letter dated July 
23, 2010, the Governor of the Virgin Islands accepted the 
Attorney General’s recommendation and approved Bason’s 
immediate termination.  Withdrawing the previous grievance, 
the Union submitted a second grievance on behalf of Bason 
challenging the Governor’s decision.  The second grievance 
went to arbitration.  On January 2, 2011, the Arbitrator 
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entered an award determining that the underlying grievance 
was arbitrable and properly before him for resolution.  He 
issued his final award and opinion on April 29, 2011, 
specifically finding that the Governor lacked just cause to 
remove Bason.  In addition, the Arbitrator awarded the 
following remedy: 
 
The Arbitrator awards the Grievant immediate 
reinstatement to his previous employment as an 
Assistant Attorney General and the immediate 
restoration of all emoluments associated with 
his employment as an Assistant Attorney 
General, including without limitation, all related 
benefits and seniority effective July 1, 2010 and 
back pay for the period between the termination 
of the Suspension imposed by the Attorney 
General in his June 7, 2010 letter to the 
Grievant (J-#4) and the Employer’s actual 
reinstatement of the Grievant to his employment 
as an Assistant Attorney General pursuant to 
this Award. 
 
(Id.) 
 
 On May 9, 2011, the Government of the Virgin Islands 
filed a complaint in the Virgin Islands Superior Court (No. 
ST-11-CV-308).  The Government asked the Virgin Islands 
Superior Court to vacate the arbitration award and to enter a 
declaratory judgment providing that the Virgin Islands Justice 
Department had no obligation to reinstate Bason.  Acting on 
Bason’s behalf, the Union filed its own complaint on June 7, 
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2011 (and the Government, in turn, filed a counterclaim) (No. 
ST-11-CV-364).  The Union asked the Virgin Islands 
Superior Court to confirm the arbitration award.  The Virgin 
Islands Superior Court consolidated the two cases.  The 
parties filed summary judgment motions (and the Union also 
filed motions to dismiss and to confirm the arbitration award). 
 
On December 13, 2011, the Virgin Islands Superior 
Court granted in part and denied in part the motions filed by 
the Union and the Government.  In its judgment, the Virgin 
Islands Superior Court vacated the April 29, 2011 arbitration 
award “but only to the extent that it grants relief prior to July 
23, 2010” and ordered “that judgment is entered in Case No. 
ST-11-CV-308 in favor of the Government on Count IV of its 
Verified Complaint to this extent only.”  (A34.)  It likewise 
entered judgment in the Government’s favor as to Count IV 
of its counterclaim “to this extent only.”  (Id.)  The Virgin 
Islands Superior Court confirmed the arbitration award “in all 
other respects” and thereby ordered judgment to be entered to 
this extent “in favor of the Union in Case No. ST-11-CV-364 
on its Action to Confirm an Arbitration Award.”  (Id.)  It was 
ordered, adjudged, and decreed that: 
 
. . . Ernest F. Bason, Esquire is 
IMMEDIATELY REINSTATED as an 
assistant attorney general in the Virgin Islands 
Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney 
General, with the immediate restoration of all 
employment benefits, seniority, and other 
emoluments of employment effective July 23, 
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2010, and back pay from July 23, 2010 to the 
date of his actual reinstatement . . . 
 
(Id.) 
 
 In its accompanying opinion, the Virgin Islands 
Superior Court considered the Government’s two theories for 
relief:  (1) that the Arbitrator exceeded his authority when he 
ruled that the Union’s grievance was timely filed; and (2) that 
“the arbitrator’s decision to reinstate Attorney Bason violates 
the public policy that assistant attorneys general can be fired 
by the Governor without cause.”  Gov’t of the V.I. v. UIW-
SIU, Nos. ST-11-CV-308, ST-11-CV-364, 2011 WL 
6936479, at *3 (V.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 2011).  According to 
the Virgin Islands Superior Court, the Arbitrator exceeded his 
authority by granting any relief based on the July 1, 2010 
letter (or a June 7, 2010 letter imposing a suspension) because 
the Union withdrew its grievance as to the July 1, 2010 action 
(and never filed a grievance with respect to the June 7, 2010 
suspension).  “Therefore, the award must be vacated to the 
extent that it awards any relief to Attorney Bason prior to July 
23, 2010.”  Id. at *5.  With respect to the government’s 
second theory, the Virgin Islands Superior Court concluded 
that “[t]he arbitrator’s decision to reinstate Bason is not 
contrary to Virgin Islands public policy.”  Id. at *7 (emphasis 
omitted).  “Therefore, the Court will confirm the immediate 
reinstatement of Ernest Bason, Esquire as an assistant 
attorney general with the Virgin Islands Department of 
Justice, Office of the Attorney General, with all benefits, 
seniority, and back pay retroactive to July 23, 2010.”  Id. at 
*9.  
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 On December 16, 2011, the Government notified the 
Virgin Islands Superior Court of Bason’s reinstatement, i.e., 
he was directed to report to work on December 19, 2011.  It 
also filed a notice of appeal on December 20, 2011, appealing 
from the opinion and judgment to the Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court.  On March 15, 2012, the Virgin Islands Superior Court 
denied the Government’s motion for a stay of the portion of 
the judgment ordering the Government to pay back pay as 
well as the Union’s motion for contempt and sanctions on 
account of the Government’s alleged failure to pay the 
requisite back pay. 
 
 The Union also moved to dismiss the Government’s 
appeal.  According to the Union, the Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court lacked appellate jurisdiction because neither the Virgin 
Islands Superior Court nor the Arbitrator ever established the 
amount of back pay owed to Bason and because the absence 
of a clear monetary judgment “renders the December 13, 
2011 Opinion and Judgment non-final for purposes of section 
32 of title 4 [of the Virgin Islands Code].”  Gov’t of the 
Virgin Islands v. UIW-SIU, S. Ct. Civ. No. 2011-0115, 2012 
WL 5901921, at *3 (V.I. Nov. 26, 2012).  “As more fully 
explained in the motion to dismiss, the failure to calculate the 
specific amount of back pay owed to Bason became relevant 
since it caused the Superior Court, in a March 15, 2012 
Order, to deny the UIW-SIU’s motion to hold the 
Government in civil contempt.”  Id. at *3 n.2.  The parties 
were directed to submit supplemental briefing on this 
jurisdictional issue.  On September 10, 2012, the Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court denied as moot the Government’s 
motion to stay the back pay portion of the judgment, noting 
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that no monetary judgment had been entered and that the 
Government had never requested a stay of the portion of the 
judgment ordering Bason’s reinstatement. 
 
After hearing oral argument, the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court disposed of the Government’s appeal in an 
order and opinion entered on November 26, 2012.  In short, it 
reversed “the portion of the decision which mandated Bason’s 
reinstatement.”  Id. at *1. 
 
Accordingly, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court stated 
in its order that “the portion of the Superior Court’s 
December 13, 2011 Opinion and Judgment which authorizes 
Ernest Bason’s reinstatement as an Assistant Attorney 
General is REVERSED” and that “the instant appeal is 
DISMISSED with respect to all issues.”  (A21-A22.)   
Furthermore, the matter was ordered remanded, and “the 
Superior Court is directed to issue a final judgment consistent 
with this Opinion.”  (A22.) 
 
In the accompanying opinion, the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court began with the threshold question of appellate 
jurisdiction.  Title 4, section 32(a) of the Virgin Islands Code 
embodies “the final judgment rule,” which generally requires 
a party “‘to raise all claims of error in a single appeal 
following final judgment on the merits.’”  Id. at *3 (quoting 
Bryant v. People, 53 V.I. 395, 400 (V.I. 2010)).  Both parties 
recognized that the December 13, 2011 opinion and judgment 
did not “technically” constitute a final order because neither 
the Virgin Islands Superior Court nor the Arbitrator 
calculated the amount of back pay the Government must 
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remit to Bason.  Id.  The Government proceeded to invoke the 
practical finality rule permitting an appellate court to review 
an order that resolves all non-ministerial issues, but the Union 
claimed that the back pay calculation “is not a purely 
mechanical task” due to the parties’ disagreement as to the 
amount.  Id.  As an alternative basis for appellate jurisdiction, 
the Government claimed that the opinion and judgment 
mandating Bason’s immediate reinstatement constituted an 
appealable injunction under title 4, section 33(b)(1) of the 
Virgin Islands Code. 
 
According to the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, “[t]he 
UIW-SIU is correct that the parties’ dispute as to how the 
Superior Court should calculate any monetary damages 
ultimately awarded to Bason precludes us from exercising 
jurisdiction under the practical finality rule.”  Id. (citing Hard 
Rock Cafe v. Lee, 54 V.I. 622, 627 n.6 (V.I. 2011)).  
However, it also agreed with the Government’s alternative 
theory that an order mandating immediate reinstatement 
constitutes an appealable injunction.  The Union requested 
Bason’s reinstatement, and the Virgin Islands Superior Court 
could have used its contempt powers if the Government had 
refused to reinstate him within the requisite time period.  
“Accordingly, we possess jurisdiction over this appeal, but 
only with respect to the Superior Court’s directive that the 
Government reinstate Bason.”  Id. 
 
Turning to the merits, the Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court determined that the portion of the Virgin Islands 
Superior Court’s opinion and judgment ordering the 
reinstatement of Bason must be reversed.  “The UIW-SIU 
 
10 
concedes that, under Section 11 of the Revised Organic Act 
of 1954, the Governor ‘may remove[ ] all officers and 
employees of the executive branch of the government of the 
Virgin Islands, except as otherwise provided . . . under the 
laws of the Virgin Islands, 48 U.S.C. § 1591, and that the 
Virgin Islands Code authorizes the Governor to remove an 
Assistant Attorney General.  See V.I.C. § 113 (‘The Assistant 
Attorneys General shall be appointed by the Governor, and 
shall hold office during the continuance in office of the 
Governor . . . unless sooner removed by the Governor.’).”  Id. 
at *4.  “Assuming without deciding that Assistant Attorneys 
General may unionize pursuant to chapter 14 of title 24 (24 
V.I.C. § 361 et seq.)—as the Superior Court found in its 
December 13, 2011 Opinion—their right to do so is not 
unlimited.”  Id. at *5 (footnotes omitted).  Title 24, section 
374 “expressly provides that ‘[r]ates of pay, hours, salaries, 
employee benefits, terms and conditions of employment and 
all matters relating thereto may be specifically negotiated in a 
collective bargaining proceeding between the public 
employer and the exclusive representative unless otherwise 
specifically restricted by law.’”  Id.  Although the Union 
attempted to harmonize section 113 and the collective 
bargaining agreement by arguing that the agreement simply 
prescribes the manner and conditions by which terminations 
may take place, “this Court disagrees that any harmonization 
is possible with respect to the reinstatement provisions.”  Id.; 
see also, e.g., id. (“Given that section 113 actually mandates 
automatic discharges of Assistant Attorneys General without 
cause at the conclusion of a Governor’s term, it is not clear to 
this Court how the provisions of the collective bargaining 
agreement which permit reinstatement by an arbitrator of an 
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Assistant Attorney General discharged without just cause can 
in any way be reconciled with the statutory enactment.”) 
 
In the end, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court 
concluded that: 
 
Since the portion of the December 13, 
2011 Opinion and Judgment mandating Bason’s 
reinstatement constituted an appealable 
injunction, this Court possesses jurisdiction 
over that portion of the underlying order 
pursuant to section 33(b)(1) of title 4.  As to the 
merits, to the extent Assistant Attorneys 
General may unionize pursuant to title 24, 
chapter 14, we hold that section 113 of title 3 
precluded the arbitrator and the Superior Court 
from mandating that the Government reinstate 
Bason as an Assistant Attorney General.  
Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the 
December 13, 2011 Opinion and Judgment that 
authorizes Bason’s reinstatement as an 
Assistant Attorney General, and direct the 
Superior Court, on remand, to issue a final 
judgment which is consistent with this Opinion. 
 
Id. 
 
 On November 30, 2012, the Union filed a motion with 
the Virgin Islands Supreme Court to stay enforcement of the 
judgment pending the filing of an application for a writ of 
certiorari in this Court.  By December 13, 2012, Congress 
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passed H.R. 6116, which in short “would eliminate our 
certiorari jurisdiction over final decisions of the Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court and replace it with direct review by 
the Supreme Court of the United States.”  Kendall I, 716 F.3d 
at 86 (citation omitted).  The President of the United States 
signed H.R. 6116 into law  on December 28, 2012.  Section 3 
of this legislation expressly provides that “[t]he amendments 
made by this Act apply to cases commenced on or after the 
date of the enactment of this Act.”  On December 21, 2012, 
the Union filed a motion asking the Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court to render an advisory opinion on the following 
question:  “Whether H.R. 6116 applies to all cases 
commenced at the trial level on or after its enactment or only 
to appeals from decisions or orders of this court commenced 
on or after the date of enactment.”  (12/21/12 Motion at 1 
(emphasis omitted).)  The Union also filed a motion 
requesting certified docket entries.  On January 15, 2013, the 
Virgin Islands Supreme Court issued its mandate and denied 
all three motions.  It noted that the Government’s appeal 
constituted an interlocutory appeal from the issuance of an 
injunction and that it never enjoined the Virgin Islands 
Superior Court from conducting any proceedings during the 
pendency of the appeal.  Furthermore, mere monetary loss 
resulting from loss of employment did not constitute good 
cause for a stay because “Appellee would be entitled to 
receive back pay in the event Appellee’s certiorari petition is 
granted and this Court’s November 26, 2012 Opinion 
ultimately reversed.”  (1/15/13 Order at 2 (citation omitted).) 
 
 On remand to the Virgin Islands Superior Court, the 
Union filed a motion to stay, while the government moved for 
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issuance of a final judgment.  The Virgin Islands Superior 
Court heard oral argument on these motions on May 30, 
2013.  To date, the parties’ respective motions are still 
pending. 
 
On January 25, 2013, the Union filed a petition for a 
writ of certiorari with this Court.  On March 8, 2013, the 
Clerk issued an order noting that this Court had just filed an 
opinion in Kendall v. Daily News Publishing Co., “addressing 
the issue of jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari after the 
passage of HR 6116.”  (3/18/13 Order at 1.)  The parties were 
given the opportunity to file jurisdictional submissions, which 
they both did. 
 
This Court filed the following order on April 24, 2013: 
 
The foregoing petition for a writ of certiorari 
will not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on 
the basis of H.R. 6116, Pub. L. 112-226, at this 
time.  The petition is granted as to the first 
question presented – i.e., whether title 24, 
section 374(a) of the Virgin Islands Code is 
harmonious with title 3, section 113(a) of the 
Virgin Islands Code.  In addition to such 
arguments as the parties wish to raise on that 
issue, the parties are directed to address whether 
the Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s decision is 
a “final decision” within the meaning of former 
48 U.S.C. § 1613 (1994), in light of that court’s 
remand to the Virgin Islands Superior Court.  
See generally Defoe v. Philip, 702 F.3d 735, 
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740-41 (3d Cir. 2012).  Our decision not to 
dismiss this petition at this time does not 
represent a ruling that this Court retains 
jurisdiction over this petition under H.R. 6116, 
Pub. L. 112-226.  That issue will be decided if 
necessary by the panel of this Court that 
considers this appeal on the merits. 
 
(4/24/13 Order at 2.) 
 
 After briefing was concluded, the Union filed a 
suggestion of death pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 43(a)(1).  It notified this Court “that on or about 
April 4, 2012 nominal appellant Attorney Ernest Bason 
passed away.”  (Suggestion of Death at 1.)  We asked the 
Union and the Government to file letter submissions 
addressing the possible effect of Bason’s death on our 
jurisdiction and whether “this matter is now moot because 
Mr. Bason cannot be reinstated to his position as an Assistant 
Attorney General.”  (10/17/13 Letter at 1.)  Both parties did 
so. 
 
II. 
 
This proceeding presents us with two threshold 
questions:  (1) whether we retain certiorari jurisdiction over 
proceedings that were filed in the Virgin Islands courts before 
the date of enactment of H.R. 6116; and (2) even if we 
thereby retain certiorari jurisdiction in the present 
circumstances under H.R. 6116, whether Bason’s death moots 
the current certiorari proceeding.  While we conclude that we 
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still possess certiorari jurisdiction over proceedings that were 
filed in the Virgin Islands courts before H.R. 6116’s 
enactment date, we will nevertheless dismiss the Union’s 
certiorari petition as moot on account of Bason’s death.  
Accordingly, we cannot—and do not—reach the question of 
“whether title 24, section 374(a) of the Virgin Islands Code is 
harmonious with title 3, section 113(a) of the Virgin Islands 
Code.”1 
 
A. H.R. 6116 
 
 In 1984, Congress authorized the Legislature of the 
Virgin Islands to establish an appellate court for the Virgin 
Islands.  See, e.g., Kendall I, 716 F.3d at 86.  In 2004, the 
legislature created the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands, 
which began to exercise its judicial functions in 2007.  See, 
e.g., Defoe, 702 F.3d at 738-39.  “[A]s set out in 48 U.S.C. § 
1613, we have certiorari jurisdiction over the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court:  ‘[F]or the first fifteen years following the 
establishment of the appellate court authorized by section 
1611(a) of this title, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit shall have jurisdiction to review by writ of 
certiorari all final decisions of the highest court of the Virgin 
Islands from which a decision could be had.’”  Id. at 739.  
Our certiorari jurisdiction under § 1613 “is not limited to 
decisions on federal law,” and “[w]e also have the discretion 
                                                 
 1 We likewise do not address “whether the 
Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s decision is a ‘final decision’ 
within the meaning of [§ 1613] in light of that court’s remand 
to the Virgin Islands Superior Court.” 
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to review the Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s decisions on 
local law” (under a deferential standard of review).  Id. at 743 
(citing Pichardo v. V.I. Comm’r of Labor, 613 F.3d 87, 96 
(3d Cir. 2010)).  This temporary period of certiorari 
jurisdiction was designed to allow enough time for the new 
court “to develop ‘sufficient institutional traditions [of its 
own] to justify direct review by the Supreme Court of the 
United States.’”  Kendall I, 716 F.3d at 86 (quoting § 1613).  
Once the Virgin Islands Supreme Court established the 
requisite traditions, it would assume the same role as the 
highest court of any state, i.e., “it will be the final authority 
on Virgin Islands law.”  Defoe, 702 F.3d at 739.  The United 
States Supreme Court would then exercise certiorari review 
over the Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s final decisions on 
questions of federal law, and, in contrast, we would no longer 
possess certiorari jurisdiction as to its rulings on questions of 
either federal or Virgin Islands local law.  See, e.g., id. 
 
“Recognizing that the Virgin Islands Supreme Court 
might develop sufficient institutional traditions before the 
fifteen-year mark, however, Congress required this Court to 
regularly evaluate and report on its progress.”  Kendall I, 716 
F.3d at 86 (citing § 1613; Defoe, 702 F.3d at 739-40).  The 
Virgin Islands Supreme Court “passed that test with flying 
colors” in 2012 “when a committee of this Court 
recommended to the Third Circuit Judicial Council that 
Congress eliminate our certiorari jurisdiction over Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court decisions in favor of direct review by 
the United States Supreme Court.”  Id. (citing Judicial 
Council of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 
Report on the Virgin Islands Supreme Court 1 (2012), 
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available at 
http://www.visusupremecourt.org/wfData/files/BookletReport
ofVirginIslandsSupremeCourt.pdf)).  The Executive and 
Legislative Branches acted with dispatch on our 
recommendation: 
 
By December 13, 2012, both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate had passed H.R. 
6116, a bill that would eliminate our certiorari 
jurisdiction over final decisions of the Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court and replace it with direct 
review by the Supreme Court of the United 
States.  See An Act to amend the Revised 
Organic Act of the Virgin Islands to provide for 
direct review by the United States Supreme 
Court of decisions of the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court, H.R. 6116, §§ 1-2, 112th Cong. 
(2012).  President Obama signed H.R. 6116 into 
law on December 28, 2012. 
  
Id.  Specifically, Section 1 of this legislation amends § 1613 
by striking the language granting this Court certiorari 
jurisdiction over final decisions of the highest court of the 
Virgin Islands.  Section 2 of H.R. 6116 adds the following 
section to the statute governing the jurisdiction of the United 
States Supreme Court: 
 
“[28 U.S.C.] § 1260.  Supreme Court of the 
Virgin Islands; certiorari 
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“Final judgments or decrees rendered by the 
Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands may be 
reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of 
certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute 
of the United States is drawn in question or 
where the validity of a statute of the Virgin 
Islands is drawn in question on the ground of its 
being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or 
laws of the United States, or where any title, 
right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up 
or claimed under the Constitution or the treaties 
or statutes of, or any commission held or 
authority exercised under, the United States.” 
 
Section 3 of H.R. 6116, entitled “Effective Date,” provides 
that “[t]he amendments made by this Act apply to cases 
commenced on or after the date of the enactment of this Act,” 
i.e., December 28, 2012. 
 
 This Court has addressed the effect of H.R. 6116 on its 
certiorari jurisdiction in two opinions involving Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court decisions on questions of federal law:  
Kendall I, 716 F.3d 82, and In re Kendall, 712 F.3d 814 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (“Kendall II”).  In Kendall I, we decided that this 
legislation does not strip us of our certiorari jurisdiction over 
cases “in which certiorari has been granted and the matter is 
awaiting decision at the time of the bill’s enactment.”  
Kendall I, 716 F.3d at 87.  The Kendall II Court then 
characterized Kendall I as “holding that Congress’s recent 
elimination of the Third Circuit’s certiorari jurisdiction over 
decisions of the Virgin Islands Supreme Court does not 
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affect, at a minimum, certiorari petitions filed before the 
effective date of the jurisdiction-stripping act.”  Kendall II, 
712 F.3d at 821 n.3 (citing Kendall I). 
 
 “When interpreting a statute, we normally presume 
that the statute does not apply retroactively—that is, to cases 
pending on the date of the law’s enactment—absent clear 
congressional intent to the contrary.”  Kendall I, 716 F.3d at 
87 (citing Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 576 (2006)).  
As we observed in Kendall I, the presumption against 
retroactivity does not apply to legislation that merely alters 
jurisdiction.  See, e.g., id.   “‘[U]nlike other intervening 
changes in the law, a jurisdiction-conferring or jurisdiction-
stripping statute usually “takes away no substantive rights but 
simply changes the tribunal that is to hear the case.”’”  Id. 
(quoting Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 576-77).  Accordingly, “‘no 
retroactivity problem arises’ with respect to an intervening 
change in jurisdiction ‘because the change in the law does not 
“impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a 
party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with 
respect to transactions already completed.”’”  Id. (quoting 
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 577). 
 
 This “‘does not mean, however, that all jurisdiction-
stripping provisions  . . . must apply to cases pending at the 
time of their enactment.’”  Id. (quoting Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 
577).  Simply put, a court still looks to generally applicable 
rules of statutory construction to decide whether a statute 
takes away its jurisdiction.  This is exactly what we did in 
Kendall I: 
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After all, “‘[n]ormal rules of [statutory] 
construction’ . . . may dictate otherwise.”  
[Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 577] (quoting Lindh v. 
Murphy, [521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997)]).  Here, 
Congress spoke clearly:  “[t]he amendments 
made by [H.R. 6116]”—that is, the elimination 
of the Third Circuit’s certiorari jurisdiction and 
substitution of such review by the United States 
Supreme Court—“apply to cases commenced 
on or after the date of the enactment of [H.R. 
6116].”  H.R. 6116, § 3.  No matter whether 
“cases commenced” carries a broader meaning 
referring to the filing of a complaint in the 
Superior Court or a narrower meaning referring 
to the filing of a certiorari petition in this 
Court—an issue we need not decide today—
Kendall commenced this case long before H.R. 
6116’s enactment. 
 
Id.  In other words, H.R. 6116 only applies to “cases 
commenced” on or after enactment date, which means that it 
does not apply to “cases commenced” before that date. 
 
 In Kendall I, we addressed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in 
Santos v. Guam, 436 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2006), which held 
that Congress’s elimination of the Ninth Circuit’s certiorari 
jurisdiction over the Guam Supreme Court (and substitution 
of direct review by the United States Supreme Court) applied 
to pending cases.  Kendall I, 716 F.3d at 87.  We noted that 
the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 
(2006), rejected the theory that jurisdiction-stripping 
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provisions apply retroactively in the absence of an express 
reservation for pending cases.  Kendall I, 716 F.3d at 87.  
“More importantly,” H.R. 6116 was markedly different from 
the legislation at issue in Santos: 
 
In Santos, the Ninth Circuit addressed a statute 
in which Congress was completely silent about 
the effective date of the jurisdiction-stripping 
provision.  Santos, 436 F.3d at 1053 (explaining 
that Congress did not “express[ ] an intent as to 
the effective date”).  By contrast, Congress was 
explicit that H.R. 6116’s amendments apply 
only “to cases commenced on or after the date 
of the enactment” of the statute.  See H.R. 6116, 
§ 3.  As a result, we retain certiorari jurisdiction 
over all cases “commenced” before the 
President signed H.R. 6116, including this one.  
See Hamdan, [548 U.S. at 584] (drawing the 
negative inference that Congress did not intend 
to eliminate jurisdiction over pending detainee 
habeas petitions where the statute was silent 
about whether its jurisdiction-stripping 
subsection applied to cases even though it 
expressly made two other subsections 
retroactive). 
 
Id. at 87-88. 
 
The Government and the Union filed their respective 
Virgin Islands Superior Court actions in 2011, and the 
Government filed its ultimately successful appeal to the 
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Virgin Islands Supreme Court in the same year.  Although the 
Virgin Islands Supreme Court entered its order and opinion 
on November 26, 2012, the Union filed its otherwise timely 
certiorari petition on January 23, 2013—after the date of 
enactment of H.R. 6116, i.e., December 28, 2012.  We 
therefore must decide the specific issue that we refused to 
reach in Kendall I:  “whether ‘cases commenced’ carries a 
broader meaning referring to the filing of a complaint in the 
Superior Court or a narrower meaning referring to the filing 
of a certiorari petition in this Court.”  Id. at 87.  Relying in 
particular on the Supreme Court’s decision in Slack v. 
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000), as well as the alleged 
purpose of the legislation, the Government asks us to construe 
this “cases commenced” language to mean the filing of a 
certiorari petition.   Based on the language of the statute, 
analogous legislation, and prior case law, we agree with the 
Union that we retain certiorari jurisdiction over proceedings 
that were filed in the Virgin Islands courts before H.R. 6116’s 
enactment date.  This includes the proceedings filed by the 
Government and the Union in the Virgin Islands Superior 
Court in 2011.  In other words, we believe that “‘cases 
commenced’ carries a broader meaning referring to the filing 
of a complaint in the [Virgin Islands] Superior Court.” 
 
 The plain language of the statutory terms “cases 
commenced” appears to encompass proceedings filed in the 
Virgin Islands courts. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 740 
F.3d 145, 149 (3d Cir. 2014) (“‘[T]he starting point for 
interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself.’  
When words are not defined within the statute, we construe 
them ‘in accordance with [their] ordinary or natural meaning.’  
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We do not, however, do so blindly.” (citations omitted)); 
Allen ex rel. Martin v. LaSalle Bank, 629 F.3d 364, 367 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (“To discern Congress’ intent we begin with the 
text.  If the statute’s plain language is unambiguous and 
expresses that intent with sufficient precision, we need not 
look further.” (citations omitted)).  The term “case” has 
generally been understood to include judicial proceedings of 
any kind.   For instance, the Supreme Court has noted that 
“‘[t]he words “case” and “cause” are constantly used as 
synonyms in statutes . . ., each meaning a proceeding in court, 
a suit, or action.’” Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 241 
(1998) (quoting Blyvew v. United States, 13 Wall. 581, 595, 
20 L. Ed. 638 (1871))).  “[A] ‘case’ in the broader sense” has 
been defined as “‘[a] civil or criminal proceeding, action, suit, 
or controversy at law or in equity.’”  In re Zarnel, 619 F.3d 
156, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 243 
(9th ed. 2009)).  In addition, a case or cause of action has 
traditionally been understood as “commenced when it is first 
brought in an appropriate court.”  Pritchett v. Office Depot, 
Inc., 420 F.3d 1090, 1094 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 3); see also, e.g., Bush v. Cheaptickets, Inc., 425 F.3d 
683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005) (“In California, as in the federal 
courts, a suit is ‘commenced’ upon filing.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 
 If it had indeed meant to strip this Court of certiorari 
jurisdiction over proceedings already filed in the Virgin 
Islands courts before the enactment date of the legislation, 
Congress could have done so far more clearly.  In fact, it has 
done as much in the past.  For example, Congress could have 
provided that H.R. 6116 applies to “appellate cases 
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commenced” or “certiorari proceedings commenced” in the 
Third Circuit.  It evidently could have stripped this Court of 
any remaining certiorari jurisdiction by simply omitting any 
reference to an effective date, which is what Congress 
apparently did with respect to the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction 
over the Guam Supreme Court.  Santos, 436 F.3d at 1053; see 
also Kendall I, 716 F.3d at 87.  When Congress stripped the 
First Circuit of its jurisdiction over the Puerto Rico Supreme 
Court, it expressly stated that “such repeal shall not deprive 
the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction to hear and determine 
appeals taken to that court from the Supreme Court of Puerto 
Rico before the effective date of this Act.”  Act of Aug. 30, 
1961, Pub. L. No. 87-189, § 3, 75 Stat. 417 (1961).  In 1988, 
Congress amended the statutory scheme governing the 
Supreme Court’s certiorari jurisdiction.  However, in doing 
so, it expressly stated that the amendments “shall not apply to 
cases pending in the Supreme Court on the effective date of 
such amendment” (or otherwise affect the right to review of a 
judgment or decree entered before the effective date).  Act of 
June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, § 7, 102 Stat. 662 
(1988).  Congress actually included this type of language with 
respect to stripping the District Court of the Virgin Islands of 
appellate jurisdiction over local actions upon the creation by 
the Virgin Islands Legislature of a Virgin Islands appellate 
court, i.e., the legislation stated that it “shall not result in the 
loss of jurisdiction of the district court over any appeal then 
pending in it.”  48 U.S.C. § 1613a(d). 
 
 
 In H.R. 6116, Congress took a different approach than 
it has in similar circumstances in the past.  In short, the 
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“Effective Date” section of H.R. 6116 does not refer to a 
particular type of proceeding or a specific judicial body.  This 
section instead uses expansive and otherwise unmodified 
language in order to govern the applicability of amendments 
taking away jurisdiction from one court and granting 
jurisdiction to another—namely—“cases commenced” on or 
after the date of enactment.  Instead of enacting an exception 
reserving our jurisdiction over “pending appeals” (or even 
“pending cases”), Congress chose to make it clear that it is 
the jurisdiction-stripping (and jurisdiction-conferring) 
legislation itself that only applies to “cases commenced” on 
or after the enactment date.  Congress likewise has repeatedly 
used somewhat similar language with respect to the 
applicability of amendments made to other statutory schemes.  
These include the supplemental jurisdiction statute, Judicial 
Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-650, Title III, § 310, 
104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (“The amendments made by this 
section shall apply to civil actions commenced on or after the 
date of the enactment of this Act”), the removal jurisdiction 
statute, Judicial Improvements Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
336, § 3(b), 100 Stat. 633 (2006) (“The Amendment made by 
this section shall apply with respect to claims in civil actions 
commenced in State courts on or after the date of the 
enactment of this section.”), and the statute governing 
removal and interlocutory appeals in class action proceedings, 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 9, 
119 Stat. 4 (2005) (“The amendments made by this Act shall 
apply to any civil action commenced on or after the date of 
enactment of this Act.”).  The term “cases” evidently carries a 
broader meaning than the words “civil action” used in these 
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various enactments (e.g., “cases” would include both criminal 
as well as civil proceedings). 
 
 We believe that prior case law also supports our 
reading of H.R. 6116.  After all, we have indicated that 
“Congress’s recent elimination of the Third Circuit’s 
certiorari jurisdiction over decisions of the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court does not affect, at a minimum, certiorari 
petitions filed before the effective date of the jurisdiction-
stripping act.”  Kendall II, 712 F.3d at 821 n.3 (citing Kendall 
I).  In Hamdan, the federal government filed a motion to 
dismiss a writ of certiorari pursuant to the Detainee Treatment 
Act, which was enacted after the Supreme Court had already 
granted the writ and (at least according to the federal 
government) had the immediate effect of repealing 
jurisdiction “not just over detainee habeas actions yet to be 
filed but also over any such actions then pending in any 
federal court—including this Court.”  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 
574.  As we observed in Kendall I, the Supreme Court instead 
applied traditional rules of statutory construction to draw “the 
negative inference that Congress did not intend to eliminate 
jurisdiction over pending detainee habeas petitions where the 
statute was silent about whether its jurisdiction-stripping 
subsection applied to cases even though it expressly made 
two other subsections retroactive.”  Kendall I, 716 F.3d at 88 
(citing Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 584).  The Hamdan Court also 
rejected the theory that “jurisdiction-stripping provisions 
automatically apply retroactively absent an express 
reservation of jurisdiction over pending cases.”  Id. at 87 
(citing Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 584).   
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 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996 (“AEDPA”) amended 28 U.S.C. § 2253 to add a new 
subsection setting forth “certificate of appealability” 
requirements governing the right to appeal in the habeas 
context.  Slack, 529 U.S. at 477-78, 480-81.  In Slack, the 
petitioner filed his habeas petition before AEDPA’s effective 
date, but the notice of appeal (as well as the district court’s 
order dismissing the petition) were filed after the legislation 
went into effect.  Id. at 479-80.  The Supreme Court 
considered “whether the pre- or post-AEDPA version of § 
2253 controls Slack’s right to appeal.”  Id. at 481.  In 
answering this question, the Slack Court took into account its 
prior AEDPA decision in Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 
(1997), in which it concluded that the new version of 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d) (stating that no habeas relief shall be 
granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in 
state court unless the decision was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application, of clearly established federal law or 
was based on an unreasonable factual determination) did not 
apply to habeas applications that were already pending when 
the statute was passed, id. at 323-27.  Applying traditional 
rules of statutory construction, the Lindh Court drew a 
negative implication from an AEDPA provision stating that a 
different part of the legislation (applicable in the capital 
context) applies to cases pending on or after the date of 
enactment.  Id. at 327 (reading provision “as indicating 
implicitly that the amendments to chapter 153 were assumed 
and meant to apply to the general run of habeas cases only 
when those cases had been filed after the date of the Act.”).  
The Supreme Court, however, rejected Slack’s attempt to rely 
on Lindh in support of his contention that § 2253(c) did not 
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apply to him because he commenced his case in the district 
court before AEDPA’s enactment.  Slack, 529 U.S. at 481.  
“[T]he [Lindh] Court held that AEDPA’s amendments to 28 
U.S.C. § 2254, the statute governing entitlement to habeas 
relief in the district court, applied to cases filed after 
AEDPA’s effective date.”  Id. (citing Lindh, 521 U.S. at 327).  
“For purposes of implementing the holding in Lindh, it must 
be recognized that § 2254 is directed to proceedings in the 
district courts while § 2253 is directed to proceedings in the 
appellate courts.”  Id.  In other words, because § 2254 is 
directed to proceedings in the district courts, it applies to 
cases filed in the district court after AEDPA.  Id.  Section 
2253 is directed to appellate proceedings, and it thereby 
applies to appellate proceedings initiated post-AEDPA even if 
the habeas petition itself was filed before the effective date of 
this legislation.  Id.  Although Lindh requires the court of 
appeals to apply pre-AEDPA law in reviewing the district 
court’s ruling for cases commenced in the district court pre-
AEDPA, the Supreme Court concluded that post-AEDPA law 
“governs the right to appeal in cases such as the one now 
before us.”  Id. 
 
 The Slack Court further explained that: 
 
While an appeal is a continuation of the 
litigation started in the trial court, it is a distinct 
step.  [Hohn, 524 U.S. at 241]; McKenzie v. A. 
Engelhard & Sons Co., [266 U.S. 131] (1924).  
We have described proceedings in the courts of 
appeals as “appellate cases.”  E.g., Order of 
Apr. 30, 1991, 500 U.S. 1009 (amendments to 
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Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure “shall 
govern all proceedings in appellate cases 
thereafter commenced”).  Under AEDPA, an 
appellate case is commenced when the 
application for a COA is filed.  Hohn, [524 U.S. 
at 241].  When Congress instructs us (as Lindh 
says it has) that application of a statute is 
triggered by the commencement of a case, the 
relevant case for a statute directed to appeals is 
the one initiated in the appellate court.  Thus, § 
2253(c) governs appellate court proceedings 
filed after AEDPA’s effective date.  We see no 
indication that Congress intended to tie 
application of the provisions to the date a 
petition was filed in the district court.  The 
COA statute establishes procedural rules and 
requires a threshold inquiry into whether the 
circuit court may entertain an appeal.  [Id. at 
248]; cf. Lindh, [521 U.S. at 327].  Because 
Slack sought appellate review two years after 
AEDPA’s effective date, § 2253(c) governs his 
right to appeal. 
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Id. at 481-82.2 
 
 At least at first blush, Slack does seem to weigh in 
favor of the Government’s interpretation of H.R. 6116, i.e., 
because the legislation is supposedly directed to proceedings 
in the Third Circuit, it would purportedly then apply to 
proceedings initiated in the Third Circuit after H.R. 6116’s 
date of enactment.  Nevertheless, we do not find Slack to be 
controlling in the present circumstances.  Initially, the 
Supreme Court was not confronted with an express provision 
stating that amendments would apply to “cases commenced” 
on or after the date of enactment of the legislation.  It 
accordingly did not discuss whether there may be a 
meaningful difference between such an open-ended and 
unmodified provision and a provision that refers, for instance, 
to “appellate cases commenced.”  Cf., e.g., AEDPA, Pub. L. 
104-132, tit. IX, § 903(c), 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (providing 
that fee revision amendments apply to “cases commenced on 
or after the date of enactment” and “appellate proceedings, in 
which an appeal is perfected on or after the date of 
enactment”).  In fact, AEDPA lacked any express provision 
governing the applicability of § 2253 (or § 2254) to pending 
                                                 
 2  The Supreme Court in Slack noted that the 
petitioner in Hohn had also argued that § 2253(c) did not 
apply because he had filed his habeas petition before 
AEDPA’s effective date.  Slack, 529 U.S. at 482.  “Though 
our opinion did not discuss whether § 2253(c) applied to 
Hohn, we would have had no reason to reach the issue we did 
resolve, that we had statutory certiorari jurisdiction to review 
the denial of a COA, if AEDPA did not apply at all.”  Id. 
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cases (and the Supreme Court accordingly turned to a 
provision stating that a different chapter of this habeas 
legislation “shall apply to cases pending on or after the date 
of the enactment of this Act”).  The habeas provisions at issue 
in Slack and Lindh likewise did not divest one court of its 
jurisdiction and confer such jurisdiction on another court.  In 
contrast, we must give effect to a statutory provision stating 
that amendments stripping us of certiorari jurisdiction (and 
vesting certiorari jurisdiction in the Supreme Court) apply to 
“cases commenced” on or after the date of enactment.  The 
statutory language at issue, Congress’s use of both similar 
and dissimilar language in other related contexts, and prior 
case law all weigh in favor of reading of this statutory 
provision as “referring to the filing of a complaint in the 
Superior Court”—and we do not believe that the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Slack alters our conclusion. 
 
 We likewise reject the Government’s assertion that the 
intent of H.R. 6116 “can only be accomplished only if the 
Supreme Court of the United States assumes exclusive 
jurisdiction over certiorari petitions filed after December 28, 
2012, the effective date of the act.”  (Respondent’s 
Jurisdiction Brief at 4.)  We acknowledge that Congress 
passed and the President signed H.R. 6116 after “a committee 
of this Court recommended to the Third Circuit Judicial 
Council that Congress eliminate our certiorari jurisdiction 
over Virgin Islands Supreme Court decisions in favor of 
direct review by the United States Supreme Court” because 
the new court had succeeded in developing sufficient 
institutional traditions to justify such direct review.  Kendall 
I, 716 F.3d at 86 (citation omitted).  In other words, the court 
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created by the Virgin Islands Legislature passed its test “with 
flying colors.”  Id. (citation omitted).  Nevertheless, taken to 
its logical conclusion, the notion that there is no longer any 
reason for us to review decisions by the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court would indicate that we should also lose 
jurisdiction even where the certiorari petition was filed or 
granted before H.R. 6116’s enactment date.  Although it 
could have taken this step (and evidently has done so in the 
past, see, e.g., id. at 87), Congress instead chose to include an 
explicit provision making it clear that its jurisdiction-stripping 
amendments only apply to “cases commenced” on or after the 
enactment date.  We accordingly have already determined 
that we retain jurisdiction with respect to proceedings in 
which the certiorari petitions were either granted or filed 
before this date.  We add that, like litigants who filed their 
certiorari petitions before December 28, 2012, parties who 
were in the midst of litigating a proceeding in the Virgin 
Islands courts could have reasonably expected that they 
would have the right to file a petition for certiorari with the 
Third Circuit and, at the very least, possibly obtain further 
review with respect to questions of Virgin Islands law (which 
would otherwise not be available in the United States 
Supreme Court).  After all, the Government and the Union 
commenced their respective Virgin Islands Superior Court 
actions in 2011, and the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, in 
turn, did not render its own decision until November 2012.  
We find it improbable that H.R. 6116 was ever meant to strip 
this Court of certiorari jurisdiction when the enactment date 
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of this legislation fell right in the middle of the applicable 
time period for filing a certiorari petition with this Court.3  
 
B. Mootness 
 
 Even though we thereby retain certiorari jurisdiction 
under H.R. 6116, we nevertheless must dismiss the certiorari 
petition as moot because of Bason’s death. 
 
 Federal courts generally lack jurisdiction whenever 
“‘“the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a 
legally cognizable interest in the outcome.”’”  McNair v. 
Synapse Group Inc., 672 F.3d 213, 224 n.11 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(quoting Merle v. United States, 351 F.3d 92, 94 (3d Cir. 
2003)).  The mootness determination implicates an intensely 
factual inquiry requiring the court to assess whether it could 
award meaningful relief despite changing circumstances.  
See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Kelly, 815 F.2d 912, 
                                                 
 3 Likewise, we must reject the Government’s 
theory that the Union’s approach to H.R. 6116 would result in 
both the United States Supreme Court and this Court 
possessing concurrent jurisdiction.  On the contrary, “we 
retain certiorari jurisdiction over all cases ‘commenced’ 
before the President signed H.R. 6116,” Kendall I, 716 F.3d 
at 88 (citation omitted), and we now conclude that such cases 
includes proceedings commenced in the Virgin Islands courts 
before that date.  In turn, the Supreme Court would not 
possess jurisdiction over such cases.  For “cases commenced” 
on or after this date, the United States Supreme Court 
possesses exclusive certiorari jurisdiction.      
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914-16 (3d Cir. 1987).  “The mootness doctrine is centrally 
concerned with the court’s ability to grant effective relief.”  
County of Morris v. Nationalist Movement, 273 F.3d 527, 
533 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum 
Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1996)).  As the Union 
notes, an otherwise lawful order does not become moot 
merely because changes in circumstances indicate that the 
need for the order may be less then when it was originally 
entered.  See, e.g., C-B Buick, Inc. v. NLRB, 506 F.2d 1087, 
1093 (3d Cir. 1974).  Additionally, voluntary compliance or 
cessation of the allegedly unlawful conduct on the part of the 
defendant generally does not render a case as moot.  See, e.g., 
Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 727 (2013) 
(stating that party claiming voluntary compliance carries 
formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear that 
allegedly wrongful conduct could not reasonably be expected 
to recur); Dep’t of Justice v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 991 
F.2d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 1993) (“[Unfair labor practice] cases, 
however, generally do not become moot when the individual 
parties resolve the specific matter that gave rise to the dispute 
because the ‘Board is entitled to have the resumption of the 
unfair practice barred by an enforcement decree.’” (quoting 
NLRB v. Raytheon Co., 398 U.S. 25, 27 (1970))).  “Instead, 
the dismissal of an action on mootness grounds requires the 
defendant to demonstrate that ‘there is no reasonable 
expectation that the wrong will be repeated.’”  Sutton v. 
Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting 
Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am. 
v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 662 (1993)).  “[T]he 
‘capable of repetition yet evading review’ doctrine permits 
consideration of a case that ‘would otherwise be deemed 
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moot’ when ‘“(1) the challenged action is, in its duration, too 
short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and 
(2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same 
complaining party will be subject to the same action again.”’”  
McNair, 672 F.3d at 224 n.11 (quoting Merle, 351 F.3d at 
94). 
 
 We do not believe that the current certiorari 
proceeding falls under the “capable of repetition yet evading 
review” doctrine.  According to the Union, H.R. 6116 
forecloses review of Virgin Islands Supreme Court decisions 
on questions of Virgin Islands law, and any future 
reinstatement issue that may arise between the Union and the 
Government thereby will forever evade review.  A statute 
stripping a federal circuit court of certiorari jurisdiction over 
final decisions of the highest court of a territory (and vesting 
the United States Supreme Court with certiorari jurisdiction at 
least with respect to questions of federal law) does not appear 
to represent the type of occurrence that could implicate this 
doctrine.  In any event, we have already concluded that we 
retain certiorari jurisdiction with respect to proceedings that 
were filed in the Virgin Islands courts before H.R. 6116’s 
date of enactment, including the proceedings filed by the 
Union and the Government in 2011.  Furthermore, it is 
Bason’s death that moots current certiorari proceeding, and 
this unfortunate and seemingly unexpected occurrence does 
not render this case capable of repetition yet evading review.  
Cf., e.g., Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 
796 n.4 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (“We would think that a 
distinction could reasonably be drawn between the terminally 
ill, all of whom necessarily will die prior to completion of the 
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litigation, and those whose cases become moot for more 
mundane or less predictable reasons.”), rev’d on other 
grounds sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 
(1997). 
 
 The Union vigorously contends that it is the real party 
in interest here.  For our part, we recognize that a labor 
union’s interest may extend beyond merely protecting the 
rights of an allegedly injured employee and that it accordingly 
may have a right to advocate on behalf of other similarly 
situated members as well as the collective bargaining unit as a 
whole.  In American Federation of Government Employees, 
Local 1941 v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 837 F.2d 
495 (D.C. Cir. 1988), a local of the American Federation of 
Government Employees (“AFGE”) sought review of a 
decision of the Federal Labor Relations Authority (“FLRA”), 
holding “that the credentials committee of an Army hospital 
about to conduct a hearing to consider adverse information 
relating to the medical procedures and proficiency of a 
certified ophthalmologist employed at the hospital did not 
commit an unfair labor practice when it refused the 
employee’s request to have his union representative with him 
at the hearing,” id. at 496.  Although the doctor resigned from 
his position and died a short time after the hospital 
commander had adopted the committee’s recommendations to 
restrict his privileges, id. at 497, the D.C. Circuit allowed the 
union to pursue an unlawful labor practice action: 
 
This controversy is not mooted by Dr. Hanna’s 
death.  As exclusive representative of Dr. 
Hanna’s bargaining unit, AFGE has a derivative 
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right to be present, on the employee’s request, 
at an examination reasonably believed by the 
employee potentially to result in disciplinary 
action.  5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(B).  Thus the 
Union itself has standing to contest the denial of 
representation as an unfair employment 
practice.  Available remedies may include a 
cease and desist order or the posting of an 
unfair labor practice notice.  See, e.g., AFGE v. 
FLRA, 777 F.2d 751, 753 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 
1985). 
 
Id. at 497 n.2.; see also, e.g., Dep’t of Justice v. FLRA, 144 
F.3d 90, 91-96 (D.C. 1998) (rejecting INS’s theory that union 
was not acting as exclusive representative at oral reply stage 
of disciplinary proceedings on grounds that union sought to 
vindicate employees’ individual interests as well as 
bargaining unit’s broader interest in proper administration of 
collective bargaining agreement and likewise rejecting 
union’s request to sanction INS for pursuing appeal after its 
alleged destruction of certain documents because whether 
agency committed unfair labor practice in refusing to produce 
documents was unaffected by whether agency later destroyed 
such documents); AFGE, Local 3090, 777 F.2d at 753 n.13 
(“This ‘other action’ may include the posting of a notice 
indicating that an agency has been found to have committed 
an unfair labor practice and that it has been ordered to cease 
committing such practices in the future.  An order requiring 
the Home to post such a notice would of course afford [the 
union] an as yet unrealized remedy for the alleged unfair 
labor practice.” (citation omitted)).   
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Furthermore, it is well established that, even though 
the death of a former employee may moot a reinstatement 
claim, a claim for back pay nevertheless survives his or her 
death.  See, e.g., Scott v. Univ. of Del., 601 F.2d 76, 81 n.8 
(3d Cir. 1979) (“We address the merits of Scott’s individual 
[discrimination] claims because the claim for back pay and 
damages survives his death.”); abrogated on other grounds, 
EF Operating Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 993 
F.2d 1046 (3d Cir. 1993); NLRB v. Atl. Towing Co., 179 
F.2d 497, 498 (5th Cir. 1950) (“Since the issuance of said 
[NLRB] order [requiring reinstatement with full 
reimbursement], Hendrix has died, but this does not render 
the case moot because, if the court sustains the order, 
Hendrix’s estate is entitled to be made whole for any loss of 
pay suffered by him”). 
 
Nevertheless, the current certiorari proceeding presents 
this Court with an unusual and even unique set of 
circumstances.  In short, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s 
order and opinion was entirely premised on the notion of 
reinstatement, and it would have dismissed the Government’s 
appeal if the Virgin Islands Superior Court had never ordered 
Bason’s immediate reinstatement.  In its submission on 
mootness, the Union quotes the Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court’s holding “‘that section 113 of title 3 precluded the 
arbitrator and the Superior Court from mandating that the 
Government reinstate Bason as an Assistant Attorney 
General’” (Petitioner’s Mootness Letter at 3 (quoting UIW-
SIU, 2012 WL 5901921, at *5)) together with the statement 
that “‘it is not clear to this Court how the provisions of [the 
CBA] which permit reinstatement by an arbitrator of an 
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Assistant Attorney General discharged without just cause can 
in any way be reconciled with the statutory enactment’” (id. 
at 3-4 (quoting UIW-SIU, 2012 WL 5901921, at *5)).  
Specifically, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court concluded 
that, “[s]ince the portion of the December 13, 2011 Opinion 
and Judgment mandating Bason’s reinstatement constituted 
an appealable injunction, this Court possesses jurisdiction 
over that portion of the underlying order.”  UIW-SIU, 2012 
WL 5901921, at *5.  It then proceeded to reverse the Virgin 
Islands Superior Court’s opinion and judgment to the extent 
that it directed the Government to reinstate Bason.  However, 
the Virgin Islands Supreme Court also dismissed the appeal 
“with respect to all other issues” (A22) because it agreed with 
the Union that the parties’ disagreement as to the calculation 
of back pay “precludes us from exercising jurisdiction,” id. at 
*3 (citation omitted).  On remand, the Virgin Islands Superior 
Court has not yet disposed of the claim for back pay. 
 
Bason’s death clearly moots any reinstatement claim 
on his behalf.  See, e.g., Scott, 601 F.2d at 81 n.8 (“Insofar as 
Scott sought injunctive and declaratory relief compelling the 
University to reinstate him and renew his contract, these 
claims have been mooted by Scott’s death.”); Loveman, 
Joseph & Loeb v. NLRB, 146 F.2d 769, 772 (5th Cir. 1945) 
(“Furthermore, her death has rendered the question of her 
reinstatement moot.”).  Given the critical role that 
reinstatement played in the Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s 
disposition, we do not see how we could reach the merits of 
its decision at this juncture.  In other words, reinstatement 
represents the critical “hook” on which this entire certiorari 
proceeding rests, and, without it, “‘“the parties lack a legally 
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cognizable interest in the outcome”’” of the certiorari 
proceeding itself.  McNair, 672 F.3d at 224 n.11 (citation 
omitted).  The proceeding thereby involves more than either 
changed circumstances indicating that the need for an order 
may be less than when it was first entered or voluntary 
compliance on the part of the Government.  Likewise, this 
proceeding does not implicate, inter alia, the right of a union 
“to be present, on the employee’s request, at an examination 
reasonably believed by the employee potentially to result in 
disciplinary action.”  AFGE, Local 1941, 837 F.2d at 497 n.2.  
While the issue of back pay may not be moot, this particular 
claim is not before us because the Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court concluded that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over this 
claim, which has yet to be decided by the Virgin Islands 
Superior Court.  In fact, it appears that the Union (or Bason’s 
estate) could continue to litigate the claim for back pay (and 
possibly other claims for relief given Bason’s death) in the 
Virgin Islands courts.  If the Union (or the Government) does 
not prevail before the Virgin Islands courts, it then could file 
a certiorari petition with us (and, as we have explained, H.R. 
6116 would not strip us of jurisdiction over such a petition). 
 
III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the Union’s 
certiorari petition as moot. 
